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THE ARC OF CLASS ACTIONS: A VIEW
FROM THE TRENCHES
*

DonaldR. Frederico,Esq.
I.

INTRODUCTION: MAKING SENSE OF THE
WRECKAGE

Think of the class action as a wounded beast - limited in its
range of motion, yet dangerous to those within its reach. This image emerges from some of the most significant developments in
class action law and practice over the past several years. Plaintiffs'
and defendants' class action lawyers frequently debate the continued vitality of class action practice, the former decrying their setbacks, the latter reveling in their victories, and both sides determined to fight on. Academics sift through the rubble of class action
jurisprudence, attempting to discern patterns and to predict what
lies ahead.1 Judges struggle to apply conflicting precedents and fill
in gaps, at times reluctantly surrendering to rigid pronouncements
from on high.
Over the years, a divided Court has issued powerful decisions that rein in many class actions. Congress also has at times
gotten into the act. One can debate the motivations behind any
particular decision or legislative action, but two opposing views
stand out: 1) restrictions on class actions have been necessary to
prevent abuses by some over-reaching plaintiffs' attorneys, and 2)
restrictions on class actions have been imposed to promote an unfair and oppressive pro-business agenda. There likely is some truth
to each of these explanations, and other, less politically charged
factors at play as well.

*Pierce Atwood LLP, Boston, Massachusetts
I See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The American ClassAction: From Birth to Maturity, 19 Theoretical Inquiries L. 1 (2018); J. Maria Glover, The Supreme
Court's "Non-Transsubstantive"Class Action, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1625 (2017);
Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, ClassActions and the Counterrevolution

Against FederalLitigation, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1495 (2017); Robert H. Klonoff,
ClassActions in the Year2026:A Prognosis,65 Emory L. J. 1569 (2016); Richard
Marcus, Bending in the Breeze: American Class Actions in the Twenty-First
Century, 65 DePaul L. Rev. 497 (2016).
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Any explanation of the forces at work to constrict or expand
class actions should start with a foundational principle: in the right
cases, the class action can be a useful device for resolving the
claims of numerous claimants through a process that balances interests of efficiency with concerns for fairness to all stakeholders,
including plaintiffs, absent class members, and defendants. The
several subdivisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 are designed to guide courts to achieve such balance, but determining
how they apply to any particular case can be a complex undertaking.
A corollary to this principle is that the balance envisioned
by Rule 23 is in the eye of the beholder, and the beholder who matters most is the judge. Judges' interpretations of class action law
may be influenced by a variety of factors. Most judges honestly
strive to apply Rule 23 correctly to the cases before them. Their
interpretations are informed by the Rule's language, by precedent,
by notions of fairness, and by pragmatic judgments of where to
draw the certification/no-certification line. Of course, like all mortals, even the best judges may at times bring unconscious biases to
their decision-making. Judges also have an institutional stake in
the process, as they bear responsibility for the efficient management of their dockets.
Conscious biases and political affinities also can influence
class action rulings. In 2011, Justice Scalia authored the groundbreaking opinions of the Court in A T&TMobilityLLC v. Concepcion2 and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.3 Many observers believed he was displaying overt hostility to class action litigation as
a matter of his judicial philosophy. That belief is understandable,
given that Justice Scalia was appointed to the Court in part because of his strongly held conservative views, and because each of
these decisions upended conventional wisdom about Rule 23 and
the place of class actions in resolving disputes. Still, attempting to
divine Justice Scalia's or any other jurist's motivations, to the extent doing so is even relevant, can be more difficult than one might
expect.

II.

AMCHEMAND THE RULE 23(B)(3) CLASS

2 563

U.S. 333 (2011).
3 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
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ACTION
Take Justice Ginsburg's opinion in the well-known asbescase,
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.4 That decision, more
tos
than any other, limited the availability of class certification in cases
involving personal injury claims, and emphasized the imperative
of avoiding intra-class conflicts in class action settlements. It
thereby struck a serious blow to lawyers seeking to employ Rule 23
to resolve mass tort claims. No doubt Justice Ginsburg's restrictive
reading of the Rule (which was joined by her conservative colleagues) was born largely from a concern that courts that do not
properly apply Rule 23's requirements to class action settlements
would fail to fulfill their responsibility of protecting absent class
members' interests in receiving a fair return for their individual
claims. To that extent, her opinion can be viewed both as a proper
interpretation of a rule designed to balance a variety of interests
and as aligned with traditionally liberal values. Nevertheless, by
rejecting an approach that would have relaxed Rule 23's requirements in the settlement approval process and glossed over myriad
individual issues inherent in personal injury claims, Justice Ginsburg crafted an opinion that has by and large benefited defendants
and disadvantaged the plaintiffs' class action bar. Whatever one
thinks of the outcome, one can admire the honesty of the approach.'
After Amchem, three things seemed clear: 1) that settlement
class actions do not get a pass from most Rule 23 requirements,6 2)
that conflicting interests among settlement class members create
Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy concerns that may preclude class certification, or at least require the creation of separately represented subclasses, and 3) that personal injury claims, which frequently
4

521 U.S. 591 (1997).

5 For an interesting discussion of partisanship, and the lack thereof, on the
Supreme Court, see David Cole, Keeping Up Appearances, THE NEW YORK
REVIEW OF BOOKS, Aug. 15, 2019, Vol. 66, No. 13, at 18.
6 As Justice Ginsburg explained, the one exception is the factor of manageability relevant to Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority requirement: "Confronted with a
request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire
whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems, see
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D), for the proposal is that there be no trial. But other
specifications of the Rule-those designed to protect absentees by blocking un-

warranted or overbroad class definitions-demand undiluted, even heightened,
attention in the settlement context." 521 U.S. at 620.
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implicate issues of causation unique to each claimant, are generally
not amenable to class treatment under Rule 23(b)(3). This last point
would also become relevant to claims of property damage caused
by environmental contamination where the parties disputed the
contamination's sources and effects. In a world increasingly
fraught with claims of mass harm, creative lawyers would have to
look for new routes to global peace.

III.

THE POST-AMCHEMRISE OF THE RULE
23(B)(2) CLASS ACTION

In response to Amchem, some lawyers began to look for viable alternatives to the Rule 23(b)(3) personal injury and property
damage classes. One avenue they explored was to re-frame their
mass tort cases to request something other than traditional monetary relief. For example, in cases involving exposure to hazardous
products, rather than seek damages for personal injuries, some
sought injunctive relief in the form of medical monitoring necessary to detect the onset of latent disease, and premised class certification on 23(b)(2) instead of 23(b)(3). The perceived advantage
was that a (b)(2) class did not require proof of the (b)(3) elements of
predominance and superiority. One year after Amchem, the Third
Circuit rejected that approach in a tobacco case,' holding that, because (b)(2) class actions are mandatory class actions, with no opportunity for class members to opt out, it was especially important
that they be cohesive. And, the court concluded that a class consisting of persons with varying degrees of exposure to and impacts
from tobacco, and individualized affirmative defenses such as
comparative and contributory negligence and statutes of limitations, was not sufficiently cohesive to warrant (b)(2) certification.'
Despite such roadblocks, some plaintiffs continued to seek
certification of their personal injury, property damage, and other
cases under Rule 23(b)(2), with mixed success in the lower federal
' Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127 (3rd Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1114 (1999).
8 Another approach some parties pursued in attempting to settle mass tort
claims was to seek certification of limited fund class actions under Rule
23(b)(1)(B). The Supreme Court delineated the limits of the limited fund approach two years after it decided Amchem, reversing approval of a limited fund
asbestos settlement in Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). Justice
Ginsburg again joined the conservative majority, with Justice Breyer writing a
dissenting opinion in which Justice Stevens joined.
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courts. Such efforts to end-run Amchem's interpretation of (b)(3)
ultimately met their match in the surprising interpretation of Rule
23 the Supreme Court announced in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes.
IV.

DUKESAS AN ANTIDOTE TO THE RULE 23(B)(2)

CLASS
On one level, the outcome of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes is not surprising. Before the Court issued its opinion, the
case was already famous for its class size - approximately 1.5 million female employees of Wal-Mart stores across the country. It
seemed quite possible that the Court would simply conclude the
class was too large for a lower court to manage. The facts also did
not clearly lend themselves to class treatment. As Justice Scalia,
who authored the Court's opinion, explained, the employees allegedly subjected to gender discrimination in violation of Title VII
worked in thousands of different stores, under the supervision of
thousands of different managers, each of whom had discretion to
make pay and promotion decisions. The company's broadly decentralized pay and promotion practices did not help the plaintiffs'
position. Moreover, to the extent the company had a relevant, uniform policy, it was a policy againstdiscrimination, and to prevail
on a class-wide basis, plaintiffs would have to prove a class-wide
practice that deviated from it.
Perhaps to meet this challenge, plaintiffs sought certification not under 23(b)(3), but under 23(b)(2), seeking an injunction
against allegedly ongoing discrimination and equitable relief in the
form of back pay. The Court likely could have relied on reasoning
like that of the Third Circuit in Barnes, holding that the class was
not sufficiently cohesive to merit certification under (b)(2). Instead,
it took a different, more radical tack. Justice Scalia's opinion completely redefined the standard for commonality under Rule
23(a)(2), a requirement that has to be met for both (b)(2) and (b)(3)
cases.
Prior to Dukes, most courts and practitioners understood
that commonality was a low bar, and because it was subsumed in
the predominance requirement for (b)(3) cases, it most often was
given short shrift. After all, if the individual issues in a case overwhelmed any possible common issues, there was no need to decide
whether the common issues existed in the first place. But because
there is no predominance requirement in (b)(2), Justice Scalia's
270
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ability to breathe new life into (a)(2) commonality had a profound
effect on plaintiffs' strategy of seeking certification under (b)(2). By
elevating the burden for (a)(2) commonality almost to the same
level as for (b)(3) predominance (and arguably blurring the distinction between the two), Justice Scalia was able to limit, if not completely negate, (b)(2)'s utility as an alternative to the (b)(3) class action.
Justice Scalia's decision in Dukes was revolutionary, and
effectively nullified a significant plaintiff strategy. Its effects on
class action practice, however, have been more nuanced. It removed an incentive for plaintiffs' lawyers to attempt to end run
Rule 23(b)(3), and likely resulted in a return to (b)(3) as the lifeblood
of most class litigation.' Certification decisions therefore continue
to turn on issues of predominance and superiority that some practitioners had hoped to avoid by invoking (b)(2). Nevertheless, certification decisions evaluating (a)(2) commonality are still a mixed
bag. Some courts follow the Dukes approach, applying the Supreme Court's enhanced interpretation of (a)(2), and sometimes
denying certification under that provision. Other courts continue
to recite the pre-Dukes interpretation, understanding (a)(2) to present a low threshold and glossing over it as they move on to the
(b)(3) analysis.o
V.

CONCEPCION'SFRONTAL ASSAULT

Two months before Justice Scalia authored the surprising
decision in Dukes, he authored the arguably more far-reaching decision in A T&TMobilityLLC v. Concepcion. Writing for the same
five-Justice majority that would soon decide Dukes, Justice Scalia
e Some lawyers continue to seek (b)(2) certification in cases in which money
damages are the principal relief requested. The Eleventh Circuit recently rebuffed such an attempt, focusing not on Rule 23(a)(2) commonality, but on the
retrospective focus of the plaintiffs' claims. See AA Suncoast Chiropractic
Clinic, P.A. v. ProgressiveAmerican Ins. Co.,938 F. 3d 1170 (11th Cir. 2019).
10 No doubt some of these approaches result from briefing by some plaintiffs' lawyers who continue to cite pre-Dukes cases for the commonality standard, sometimes ignoring Dukes entirely. Whatever the explanation may be for
their doing so (which could include simply old habits dying hard, cutting and
pasting from pre-Dukes briefs, or recognizing that (a)(2) commonality is subsumed in (b)(3) predominance), such lawyers provide an opportunity for alert
defense counsel to point out their mistake and thus risk undercutting their credibility in court.
271
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reasoned that a class action waiver contained in a consumer contract's arbitration clause was enforceable because the Federal Arbitration Act," which has been held to embody "a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements,"" preempted the state law
under which the waiver had been declared unconscionable. In
other words, even a contractual provision barring class actions that
state law had declared grossly unfair to the consumer could be enforced because of a federal law passed in 1925, four decades before
the amendments to Rule 23 that gave us the modern class action. 3
The Court, again in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, doubled
down on Concepcion when it decided American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant," extending Concepcion's impact to
cases raising federal claims, and expressly rejecting the argument
that class action waivers should be invalidated where they would
effectively deprive plaintiffs of the opportunity to vindicate their
rights because of the prohibitive cost of individual litigation.
The Court's decision in Concepcion struck a blow from
which much class action practice may never recover, at least not
without Congressional action.1 5 Its impact is deeper than that of
Dukes because it is different in nature. Dukes represents an interpretation of Rule 23, a Rule which is always applied in the first
instance by federal judges, and whose application is a matter of
discretion, subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.
Litigants who are allowed to proceed in those courts are able to
move for class certification because they have been given access to
the judicial system.
Concepcion is more radical because it denies plaintiffs access to the courts ab initio. Once relegated to arbitration, plaintiffs
have no opportunity to advance class claims in court. And, if the
" 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1925).
12 Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (U.S. May 21, 2018)
(quoting Moses H Cone MemorialHospitalv. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24 (1983)).
13 See id. at 1624 ("Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 didn't create the modern class action until 1966").
14 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
" On September 20, 2019, the House of Representatives passed a bill that
would declare pre-dispute arbitration agreements and "joint-action waivers" invalid and unenforceable in employment, consumer, antitrust, and civil rights
disputes. Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2019). In the Senate, the bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, where it currently resides.
272
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arbitration agreement does not expressly allow for class arbitration, they are limited to arbitration of only their individual
claims. 6 Unlike courts ruling on motions for class certification,
courts faced with motions to compel individual arbitration because
of well-constructed arbitration agreements containing class action
waivers generally have no discretion; they may not entertain the
plaintiffs' claims.
In the wake of Concepcion, many businesses have adopted
arbitration clauses with class action waivers in their consumer contracts." Still, many have not. We have seen this disparity, for example, in bank overdraft fee litigation, where some banks have
successfully shielded themselves from class action litigation with
class action waivers, while others either have not thought to do so
or have chosen not to. Some banks were slow to the class action
waiver table because Congress, in Dodd-Frank,1 8 had authorized
the CFPB to determine whether such waivers should be permitted
in consumer finance agreements. After years of study, the CFPB
issued a final rule prohibiting banks and other providers of consumer financial products and services from using class action
waivers in their customer agreements.1 9 Less than two months after the rule's effective date, on November 1, 2017, with Republicans having gained control of both Congress and the White House,

16 Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1412 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2019).
After the Supreme Court decided Lamps Plus, the Second Circuit reversed a
district court's reversal of an arbitrator's decision allowing an employment
claim to proceed through class arbitration. The court held that, where the arbitration agreement, signed by all class members, authorized the arbitrator to decide the threshold question of class arbitrability, the arbitrator had acted within
her authority in allowing class arbitration to proceed. The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the arbitrator exceeded her authority in certifying an opt-out, as opposed to a mandatory, class.
See Jock v. Sterlingjewelers, 942 F.3d 617, 620 (2nd Cir. 2019).
" See Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1644 n. 12 (Ginsburg, R.B., dissenting)
("No surprise [after Concepcion and Italian Colors], the number of companies
incorporating express class-action waivers in consumer and employee arbitration agreements spiked.").
18 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
19 Arbitration Agreements, 12 C.F.R. § 1040 (2017).
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the President signed into law a Joint Resolution of Congress nullifying the new rule. 20
Some businesses that have chosen not to adopt class action
waivers may have done so not because they welcome class actions,
but because they dread arbitration. For such companies, pain from
a small number of large wounds may be preferable to pain from a
thousand tiny cuts. And, some plaintiffs' lawyers have indeed inflicted pain on some defendants by bringing large numbers of individual arbitration proceedings against them.21
Concepcion's dramatic reach is not limited to consumer
cases. Many businesses also have adopted class action waivers in
their employment agreements. In the early post-Concepcion era,
the National Labor Relations Act22 stood as an obstacle to such efforts when employees complained that requiring them to sign arbitration agreements with class action waivers violated the Act's
protections for employees seeking to engage in concerted activities.23 The Supreme Court put an end to this argument in Epic Systems v. Lewis, holding that class and collective action waivers in
arbitration provisions contained in employment agreements do not
conflict with the NLRA and are, therefore, enforceable. Moreover,
the NLRB recently took Epic Systems a step further, ruling that
employers may require employees to sign arbitration agreements

20 Joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8
of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection relating to "Arbitration Agreements", Pub. L. No. 115-74,
131 Stat. 1243 (2017). See Arbitration Agreements, 82 FR 55500 (Nov. 22, 2017)
(removing Part 1040 from 12 CFR in light of Congressional action disapproving
of the final rule).
" For example, after Uber Technologies, Inc. won rulings from the 9' Circuit finding its arbitration agreements and class action waivers enforceable,
O'Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 904 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2018), the
drivers' lawyers filed thousands of individual arbitration cases. See Joel Rosenblatt, Uber Gambled on Driver Arbitration and Might Have Come Up the
Loser, L.A. Times, (May 8, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-uberipo-arbitration-miscalculation-20190508-story.html. Given that development,
the Third Circuit may have done Uber a favor when it held that its arbitration
agreements with drivers may be unenforceable under the FAA's exemption for
employment contracts of transportation workers. Singh v. Uber Technologies
Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 214 (3rd Cir. 2019).

"
23

29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1935).
See, e.g., D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (2012).
274
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that prohibit them from opting in to collective actions, even after
a collective action has been commenced. 4

VI.

WHAT REMAINS OF THE LITIGATION CLASS

It has been widely recognized since Amchem that Rule
23(b)(3) class actions seeking damages for personal injuries, such
as putative class actions filed in mass tort cases, cannot be certified.25 Further, since Dukes, Plaintiffs' lawyers seeking to circumvent the higher standard of proof for class certification under Rule
23(b)(3) by invoking Rule 23(b)(2) have been limited by that decision's heightened (a)(2) commonality standard. And, after Concepcion, the only cases that even have the potential for class action
treatment are cases in which the parties' relationships are not governed by written agreements at all (e.g, the relationship between a
consumer and a manufacturer of an inexpensive household item
purchased in a retail store), are governed by written agreements
that do not require individual arbitration, or are governed by written agreements containing class action waivers that are not enforceable as a matter of state contract law.
This latter exception, perhaps originally viewed as narrow,
has seen something of a resurgence. It was viewed as narrow because Concepcion itself held that the FAA preempted California's
contract law doctrine of unconscionability. In my own state of
Massachusetts, the courts struggled with similar attempts to avoid
class action waivers through the application of state law, only to
finally concede after Italian Colorsthat the Supreme Court's decisions made such attempts unavailing.2 6
For those who would like to see state law prevail, there recently have been glimmers of hope. Last year, the First Circuit,
applying Massachusetts contract law, struck down a class action
24 Cordua Restaurants, 368 NLRB No. 43 (Aug. 14, 2019).
25

But see In re Nat'lFootballLeague PlayersConcussion InjuryLitig., 821

F.3d 410, 434 (3d Cir. 2016) (distinguishing Amchem in affirming district court's
certification of personal injury settlement class), cert. denied, Gilchrist v. Nat'l
FootballLeague, 137 S. Ct. 591 (2016), and Armstrong v. Nat' FootballLeague,
137 S. Ct. 607 (2016).
26 See Feeney v. Dell, Inc., 993 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Mass. 2013) ("Although we
regard as untenable the Supreme Court's view that 'the FAA's command to
enforce arbitration agreements trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution
of low-value claims,' ... we are bound to accept that view as a controlling statement of Federal law.").
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waiver in a ride-sharing contract because the ride-sharing service
had not made its Terms of Service sufficiently conspicuous in its
mobile app.2" Even more recently, the Eighth Circuit reached a
similar result based on Missouri contract law in a Fair Labor
Standards Act 28 case involving a class action waiver and arbitration provision contained in an employee handbook viewed through
a link on a company's network.29 Because such decisions are based
on state law governing contract formation, they are generally
30
thought to be consistent with the FAA's savings clause and with
the Supreme Court's arbitration decisions, which of necessity recognize the savings clause's continued vitality. These circuit court
rulings may be most relevant to contracts formed electronically,
but the willingness of some federal appellate courts to invalidate
class action waivers and arbitration agreements after Concepcion
and Italian Colorsrepresents a crack in the Concepcion armor.
Outside.of the arbitration arena, many important issues affecting federal class actions remain unsettled, including: the existence and nature of an implied requirement of ascertainability;" the
exact contours of the injury-in-fact requirement for Article III
standing;12 whether Daubertapplies to expert evidence offered at
the class certification stage;33 whether, and if so, under what circumstances a class can be certified that includes uninjured class
" See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 2018).
28 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 - 219 (2018).
29 See Shockley v. PrimeLending, 929 F.3d 1012, 1019-20 (8th Cir. 2019).
30 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (declaring arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law orin equity for the revocation ofany contract.") (emphasis added).
31 See Mullins v. DirectDigital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015) (discussing split among circuits concerning whether to apply a "heightened" standard of
ascertainability that requires showing of a reliable and administratively feasible
way of identifying class members, and adopting "weak" standard of requiring
only that a class be defined clearly and based on objective criteria), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016).
32

See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548-50 (2016) (vacating the

Ninth Circuit's reversal of district court's order dismissing FCRA class action
for lack of standing because appellate court failed to consider "concreteness" requirement for Article III standing).
" See. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 32 n.4 (2013) (the Court had
granted certiorari to address Daubert's applicability at the class certification
stage, but addressed a different question because petitioners failed to object to
the admission of the expert's testimony).
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members;3 4 the permissible scope of issue certification under Rule
23(c)(4);11 the applicability of the Court's personal jurisdiction decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court to class actions; 36 and the fairness of cy-pres-only class settlements.3 7 State
courts also continue to contend with some of these issues, as the
California Supreme Court recently did when it rejected ascertainability as an implied requirement for class certification. 38
Most cases, of course, are decided in trial courts, and United
States District Judges continue to play a vital role in determining
the fate of would-be class actions. District Judges possess a wide
range of experience with class actions, resulting in a similar range
of expertise in handling them. Fortunately, through the Federal
Judicial Center and other repositories, judges have a host of resources available to assist them in deciding class action issues.
Some judges, both in the district courts and, to a lesser extent, in
the circuit courts, may feel empowered to boldly distinguish Supreme Court precedent, knowing that the Court is unlikely ever to
review their rulings.

31 See In reAsacolAntitrustLitig., 907 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2018) (holding that,
where injury-in-fact is an element of. a claim, Rule 23(b)(3) requires plaintiff to
demonstrate that there is a reasonable and workable plan for defendant to challenge class members' claims of injury in a manner that does not result in overwhelming individual issues, and discussing decisions of other Circuits regarding
certification of classes that include uninjured class members).
as See Martin v. Behr Dayton Thermal Prods., Inc., 896 F.3d 405 (6th Cir.
2018) (invoking Rule 23(c)(4) and affirming certification of seven issues for class
treatment, and discussing other circuits' 23(c)(4) rulings), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
1319 (2019); see also L. Hines, Codifying the Issue Class Action, 16 Nev. L. J.
625 (2016).
36

See Joan R. Camagong, Applying Bristol-MyersSquibb to ClassActions,

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/products-liability/practice/2019/applying-bristol-myerssquibb-to-class-actions/ (last updated February 05, 2019); Katherine S. Kayatta,
FederalDistrictCourts Tackle Application of Bristol-MyersSquibb v. Superior
Court to ClassActions, FIRST CLASS DEFENSE BLOG, https://www.firstclassdefense.com/federal-district-courts-tackle-application-of-bristol-myers-squibbco-v-superior-court-to-class-actions/ (last updated February 14, 2018).
"7 Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1046 (2019) (per curiam) (vacating and
remanding 9' Circuit decision upholding cy-pres-only settlement for lower court

to consider issue of standing under Spokeo).
38 Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 445 P.3d 626 (Cal. 2019).
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THE PROSPECTS FOR THE SETTLEMENT CLASS

Consumer and labor advocates and the plaintiffs' bar, on
the one hand, and business interests and the defense bar, on the
other, tend to vigorously disagree about the social utility of class
actions. At one level, the divide between these groups on this issue
represents a manifestation of the continued and increasing polarization of American society, or least of the two major political parties. Their disagreements, often intractable, may in some cases diminish at the extremes. For example, even some long-time defense
attorneys might quietly agree that some mandatory arbitration decisions have gone too far. Nevertheless, as fiduciaries, defense
counsel may consider themselves duty-bound to advise their clients of these decisions and the protections from class litigation that
they afford, regardless of whether they agree with them. And, as
their clients act on what they learn, more and more potential class
litigation battles disappear into the individual arbitration fog.
Despite the generally opposing viewpoints of the two major
factions, there is one area of class action practice to which they
might look for common ground: class action settlements. In Amchem, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to make the settlement task easier by applying a lower standard to settlement class
certifications, but it rejected the prospect of effectively amending
Rule 23 by fiat. More importantly, in Amchem and Ortiz, it reinforced the crucial role of federal courts as guardians of the interests
of putative settlement class members. 39 Despite attempts in the intervening years to amend the Rule to relax the certification requirements for settlement classes, as of this writing no such change has
been made.
Both Congress and the Court have adopted other changes.
When it passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,40 Congress
simultaneously broadened federal jurisdiction over class actions,
thus helping defendants avoid plaintiff-friendly "magnet"

39 The Court in Amchem noted that, at the time of its decision, a proposed
amendment to Rule 23(b) that would have permitted certification of settlement
classes "even though the requirements of subdivision (b)(3) might not be met for
purposes of trial" was pending with the Judicial Conference Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, but had met significant opposition and
had not yet been acted upon. Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. at 619.
40 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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jurisdictions and changed the rules for calculating attorneys' fees
in coupon settlements, thus largely negating what had been considered an abusive settlement practice. The 2018 amendments to
Rule 23(e) made two other major changes. Rule 23(e) (1) now requires courts to exercise greater scrutiny over proposed settlements
before authorizing notice to the class (commonly, but inaccurately,
referred to as the "preliminary approval" stage). Rule 23(e)(5)(B)
requires court approval of payments or other consideration provided in exchange for "forgoing or withdrawing an objection" or
for "forgoing, dismissing, or abandoning an appeal from a judgment approving" a proposed settlement. Each of these changes has
the admirable and important goal of deterring abuses of the settlement process, abuses that draw special, and often deserved, criticism in the context of mass tort litigation." They do so, however,
by erecting obstacles and speed bumps that will make even some
desirable settlements more difficult to achieve. 2
Some plaintiffs' lawyers recently came up with an attempt
at a new innovation designed to facilitate class settlements in mass
tort cases. They proposed the "negotiation class," a class that would
be certified solely for purposes of attempting to negotiate a settlement to resolve thousands of individual lawsuits. In a case of first
impression, the judge presiding over the prescription opiate MDL
pending in the Northern District of Ohio certified the first-ever negotiation class.43 On interlocutory review, however, a divided
panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision,
holding that Rule 23 does not authorize certification of a negotiation class, and courts are not free to invent new forms of class action.4 4

Many likely would agree with the Sixth Circuit's ruling that
Rule 23 as currently written does not authorize certification of a
negotiation class, but that does not necessarily mean that a negotiation class is a bad idea. In the right cases, the argument goes, such
a device could help courts clear their dockets of burdensome, difficult-to-manage litigation, provide meaningful relief to claimants,
41 For a detailed critical analysis of mass tort settlements, see Elizabeth
Chamblee Burch, MASS TORT DEALS (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2019).
42 The new provisions concerning withdrawal of objections, of course, may
also deter the filing of frivolous or extortionate objections, and in that sense may
facilitate class action settlements.
In re Nat'lPrescriptionOpiate Litig., 332 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ohio 2019).
44 In re Nat'l PrescriptionOpiate Litig., Nos. 19-4097/4099 (6th Cir. Sept.

24, 2020).
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and accord businesses repose from significant burden and expense.
Whatever one thinks of the concept and its prospects, one must
give its proponents high marks for creativity.
Both the plaintiff and defense class action bars should be
receptive to new ideas for facilitating class action settlements.
They particularly should continue to consider possible amendments to Rule 23 that would ease the requirements for settlement
class certification, assuming that amendments can be devised that
would not significantly increase the risks of unfairness to absent
class members or undue pressure on defendants. The perceived
hostility towards class actions reflected in some Supreme Court decisions need not translate into hostility towards class action settlements. Rather, all constituencies should recognize what many trial
and appellate judges already know - that class action settlements,
properly conceived and implemented, can, in the right cases, serve
as useful means for providing relief to large groups of allegedly injured parties, while allowing defendants to put disputes behind
them and return their attention to going-forward business concerns.

VIII. CONCLUSION
To paraphrase a misquoted quip of Mark Twain,4 the reports of the class action's death are greatly exaggerated. Since the
Supreme Court's landmark rulings in 2011, however, many have
fretted that class actions are on life support. As mentioned at the
beginning of this article, Rule 23 was meant to strike a balance
among conflicting interests. It should hardly be surprising when
that balance tips in the direction in which courts lean, and certainly
some significant precedents of the conservative-majority Court
lean right. Still, very few cases reach the Supreme Court. Lower
federal courts as well as state courts will continue to develop class
action law in cases not foreclosed by arbitration, arriving at varying and, at times, conflicting results in the gaps the Court has not
yet closed. Even the Court's arbitration rulings, which after all are
based only on its interpretations of a federal statute, could become
irrelevant when power someday shifts in Washington. For now, it
4 Robert Deis, Reports ofMark Twain's QuipAbout His Death are Greatly
http://www.thisdayinTHISDAYINQUOTES.COM,
Misquoted...,
quotes.com/2010/06/reports-of-my-death-are-greatly.html(last updated Tune 2,
2018).
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seems safe to say that the arc of class actions bends towards defendants. But it is also true that the arc is long and subject to the
many forces of change.
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